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P A R A G O N O R P A R O D Y ? 
Appraisals of the political systém of the Czechos lovak 'First Republ ic ' have varied 
greatly, ranging from the u t m o s t praise t o ut ter c o n d e m n a t i o n . Needless to say, these 
evaluations have n o t been unaffected b y the political or nat ional context in w h i c h 
t h e y appeared. So, British and American accounts usually have been favourable 
t o w a r d s the First Republic, while G e r m a n portra i t s have tended to be less flattering. 1 
In the post-1948 C z e c h context, the m o r e oppressive the C o m m u n i s t regime was, 
the m o r e hosti le its a t t i tude t o w a r d the First Republic. Conversely, after 1989, ad-
mirat ion of the First Republ ic seemed almost m a n d a t o r y in public discourse as well 
as in scholarly writ ings. 2 Indeed, in 1995 President Václav Havel held u p the State as 
Compare Mamatey, Victor S./Luža, Radomír (eds.): A History of the Czechoslovak 
Republic 1918-1948, Princeton 1973 to Hoensch, Jörg K.: Geschichte der Tschechoslowa­
kischen Republik 1918-1965. Stuttgart 1966, or to Bosl, Karl (ed.): Handbuch der Ge­
schichte der böhmischen Länder. Vol. 4, Stuttgart 1970. I refer to post-war West German 
literatuře only. In recent years the picture has become far more varied on both sides of the 
Atlantic and German scholarship focussed less on Sudeten German grievances. See for 
instance Miller, Daniel E.: Forging Political Compromise: Antonin Svehla and the Czecho­
slovak Republican Party 1918-1933. Pittsburgh 1999. -Feinberg, Melissa: Elusive Equality: 
Gender, Citizenship, and the Limits of Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1918-1950. 
Pittsburgh 2006. - Zakra, Tara: Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for 
Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948. Forthcoming (Ithaca 2008). - Boyer, 
Christoph: Nationale Kontrahenten oder Partner? Studien zu den Beziehungen zwischen 
Tschechen und Deutschen in der Wirtschaft der ČSR (1918-1938). München 1999. - Wessel, 
Martin Schulze (ed.): Loyalitäten in der Tschechechoslowakischen Republik 1918-1938. 
München 2004 (VCC 101). - Zuckert, Martin: Zwischen Nationsidee und staatlicher Reali­
tät: Die tschechoslowakische Armee und ihre Nationalitätenpolitik 1918-1938. München 
2006 (VCC 106). 
Reactions from the historical 'establishmenť to heretical voices were at times furious. See 
Olivová, Věra: Manipulace s dějinami první republiky [Manipulations with the History of 
the First Republic]. In: Český Časopis Historický 91 (1993) 442-459, a review of the criti-
cal interpretation of conventional Czech historical self-perceptions offered by "Podiven" (a 
pseudonym for Petr Pithart, Petr Příhoda, and Milan Otáhal): Češi v dějinách nové doby: 
pokus o zrcadlo [The Czechs in Modern History: An Attempt at a Mirror]. Praha 1991, or 
Eva Broklova's review of Klimek, Antonín: Boj o hrad, vol. 1 Praha 1996. In: Politologická 
revue 3 (1997) 192-199. Klimek's offence consisted of bringing a less flattering portrait of 
T. G. Masaryk's political practice than commonly offered. Common to these reactions was 
the assumption that a critical opinion about the statě of Czechoslovak democracy in the 
inter-war years was proof of the author's own anti-democratic attitudes today or of his 
hostility to his own nation. Commenting on the heated response to Klimek's work, Josef 
Harna spoke in 1998 of " [...] one of the greatest weaknesses of modern Czech historiogra-
phy, námely the absence of an atmosphere of discussion." Harna, Josef: Česká historiogra­
fie a trendy výzkumu dějin meziválečného Československa ke konci 20. století [Czech 
historiography and trends in the study of the history of inter-war Czechoslovakia towards 
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an international paragon, claiming that "[•••] a modern, democratic, liberal State was 
purposefully created here on the basis of the values to which the entire democratic 
Europe of today is committed as well, and in which it sees its future."3 
The actual functioning of this "modern, democratic, liberal State" will be discus-
sed in the following páper, but a key delimitation must first be explained: The title 
speaks of Czech democracy only, seemingly ignoring the fact that we are studying 
a Czechoslovak republic with a large German minority. There is a pragmatic side 
to this, since there is no scope here for a discussion of Slovák or Sudeten German 
attitudes towards democracy in generál, or to the inter-war Czechoslovak version 
thereof in particular. But more fundamentally, this limited perspective reflects the 
predominant Czech perception, since the Czechs have tended to regard this demo­
cracy as their nationalproperty, and themselves as its fathers, its only real guardians 
- dismissing the Slovaks and the Germans as 'disloyal Opposition' and then 'traitors' 
- and hence also the only true heirs to it today.4 In the First Republic, this under-
standing of the relationship between nation and State also expressed itself in a very 
modest Czech interest in granting access to the minorities at the forums of real deci-
sion-making (the Pětka, the inner Hrad circle etc.), in spite of the occasional mini-
sterial office for a Slovák or a German. 
The political systém - a brief presentation 
In October 1918, Masaryk and the domestic national leaders uniformly declared that 
the new Czechoslovak State was to be a democracy. This was confirmed in the 
Czechoslovak Constitution of February 29, 1920, which described the statě as a 
democratic republic with a president at its head, and a bicameral parliament elected 
by proportional vote with no limiting threshold. Suffrage was equal, secret, and uni­
versal, a segregation of powers prescribed, and all fundamental civil and political 
rights guaranteed according to contemporary Standards. In the Republic's lifetime 
four generál elections were held, in 1920, 1925, 1929, and 1935, with no ban on the 
Communists or on Henlein's Sudeten German Party. From 1920 until the Munich 
the end of the 20l Century]. In: Valenta, Jaroslav/Vordček, Emil/Hama, Josef: Českoslo­
vensko 1918-1938: Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě [Czechoslovakia 1918-1938: The 
Fates of a Democracy in Central Europe]. Praha 1999, 41-47, here 44. - The Situation has 
clearly improved in the second decade after the fall of Communism, which also has brought 
two major studies in the history of the First Republic: Klimek, Antonín: Velké dějiny zemí 
Koruny české [A Big History of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown], vol. 13, 1918-1929, 
Praha, Litomyšl 2000; vol. 14, 1929-1938, Praha, Litomyšl 2002. - Kdrník, Zdeněk: České 
země v éře první republiky [The Bohemian Lands in the Era of the First Republic] (1918-
1938). 3 vols. Praha 2000, 2002, and 2003. 
'Czechs and Germans on the Way to a Good Neighbourship'. Speech delivered at the 
Charles University, Prague, February 17, 1995. English translation found at: http://  
old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1995/1702_uk.html (accessed April 2007). 
Olivová, Věra: The Czechoslovak Government and its 'disloyal' Opposition, 1918-1938. In: 
Morison, John (ed.): The Czech and Slovák Experience. Selected Papers from the Fourth 
World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990. Houndmills, 
London 1992, 89-101. - Kunc, Jiří: Stranické systémy v re/konstrukci [Party Systems in 
re/construction]. Praha 2000, 171. 
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Agreement of September 1938 these foundat ions of the political systém were never 
seriously threatened. O n l y T. G. Masaryk and, from 1935, Edvard Beneš held the 
presidency, and the seventeen cabinets in t w e n t y years were the o u t c o m e of techni-
cal reshuffling a m o n g coalit ion partners rather than expressions of any fundamental 
change. T h u s , it seems fair to conclude wi th Joseph Rothschi ld that the "polit ical 
h i s tory of interwar Czechoslovakia [...] was un ique in East Centra l E u r o p e n o t only 
for its u n i n t e r r u p t e d const i tut ional and civil l ibertarian continuity, b u t also for a pat­
tern of extraordinary stability." 5 
The Problem of the Second Republic 
Against this background, the speed and scale of the coUapse of this democrat ic 
systém after O c t o b e r 1938 is all the m o r e striking. Within t w o m o n t h s , and w i t h o u t 
any p r o n o u n c e d political resistance or public protest , the pluralistic par l iamentary 
systém was abandoned, the old parties prohib i ted or absorbed into t w o n e w parties 
- one ruling, one subordinate and barely tolerated - an authori tar ian regime in-
stalled, and m a n y basic political and civic rights suspended. 6 
These developments call into quest ion the solidity of the C z e c h c o m m i t m e n t to 
democracy. T h e tradit ional w a y to handle this discrepancy has been to p u t a wall 
between the First and the Second Republ ic and claim a complete discont inuity be-
tween the two, placing all b lame for developments in the latter o n foreign influences 
and pressure. T h e C z e c h bending to this pressure is then explained b y the t rauma 
caused b y the dramatic recent events. In T h e o d o r e Prochazka ' s w o r d s : 
Munich created unprecedented confusion in the minds of the Czech people [...] In this agitat-
ed State of mind they were prone to rejecting their traditional values and their past represen-
tatives only because they had temporarily failed. 
Rothschild, Joseph: East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. Seattle, London 
1974, 100. 
For two thorough accounts of the history of the Second Republic, see Kuklik, Jan/Gebhart, 
Jan: Druhá republika 1938-1939: Svár demokracie a totality v politickém, společenském a 
kulturním životě [The Second Republic 1938-1939: The Struggle Between Democracy and 
Totalitarianism in the Political, Social and Cultural Life]. Praha, Litomyšl 2004. -
Procházka, Theodore: The Second Republic: The Disintegration of Post-Munich Czecho­
slovakia (October 1938 - March 1939). New York 1981. 
Ibid. 56. - Kárník too insists that it is erroneous to suggest that any domestic, 'pre-Munich' 
factors contributed to the collapse of the political systém of the First Republic, see Kárník: 
České země, vol. 3, 634 (cf. fn. 2). - Kuklik and Gebhart also follow this paradigm, see Kuk-
lík/Gebhart: Druhá republika 11-12, 36-50 (cf. fn. 6), and Jan Rataj's critical review of their 
book: Rataj, Jan: Konečná diagnóza druhé republiky? [The Final Diagnosis of the Second 
Republic?]. In: Soudobé dějiny 12 (2005) 1, 140-154, in particular 147. - Elsewhere, 
Procházka remarked with an interesting modal expression that "[t]he party systém had to 
be simplified" (emphasis added), thereby presenting this process not as a matter of political 
choice, but as an objective necessity dictated by 'History' itself. See Procházka, Theodore: 
The Second Republic, 1938-1939. In: Mamatey I Luza: A History of the Czechoslovak 
Republic 262 (cf. fn. 1). -Josef Harna too resorts to psychology when explaining the rapid 
dismantling of party pluralism in the fall of 1938: "The Czech political party systém [stra-
nictví] collapsed only after Munich under the pressure from the international Situation, 
accompanied by feelings of hopelessness, powerlessness and moral frustration brought for-
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To interpret C z e c h political behaviour in the Second Republ ic t h r o u g h the p u r e -
ly psychological f ramework of collective psychosis is, however, unsatisfactory. A n d 
as Peter H e u m o s has sarcastically remarked, at tempts t o explain the radical break 
wi th the previous democrat ic o r d e r as caused b y the territorial losses suggest a one-
dimensional, causal relat ionship between the loss of sovereignty and C z e c h au-
thor i tar ian political developments . This leads t o the related conclusion that C z e c h 
democracy itself was a d e p e n d e n t variable of foreign political stability, and hence just 
as ' in-authent ic ' as its counterpar t . 8 Also, if the G e r m a n s and the Slovaks were the 
main anti-democrat ic forces in the First Republic, and the Czechs innately d e m o ­
cratic, the cession of Sudeten G e r m a n terr i tory and the establishment of Slovák 
a u t o n o m y ought t o have s t rengthened C z e c h democracy, rather than p r o v o k e its 
immediate farewell. 
Recently, 'revisionists ' in the C z e c h Republ ic and abroad have challenged the 
tradit ional interpretat ion. H e u m o s has argued from a social h i s tory perspective that 
the political systém of the First Republ ic suffered from certain " c o n s t r u c t i o n e r r o r s " 
that weakened its ability t o mobil ize politically in defence of democracy and left it 
w i t h a certain "author i ta r ian p o t e n t i a l . " 9 F r o m Prague, Jan Rataj has s h o w n convin-
cingly h o w the authori tar ian ideology developed in the Second Republ ic had firm 
domest ic roots and m a n y ardent, well-prepared supporters inspired b y contem-
p o r a r y fascist models . T h e rapid i n t r o d u c t i o n of anti-democratic, racist policies was 
b y n o means a mere passive adaptat ion t o foreign pressures, and Rataj therefore 
concludes: 
[...] the Nazi occupation onMarch 15, 1939paradoxically prevented a completely fascist trans-
formation of the Czech part of the statě through Czech means of power and from Czech pro-
grammatic sources. 
ward by the dictate of Munich." Harna, Josef: Stranickopolitický systém v Československu 
v letech 1918-1938 [The Party Political System in Czechoslovakia 1918-1938]. In: Malíř, 
Jiří/Marek, Pavel (eds.): Politické strany: Vývoj politických stran a hnutí v českých zemích 
a Československu 1861-2004. Vol. 1: Období 1861-1938 [Political Parties: The Develop­
ment of Political Parties and Movements in the Bohemian Lands and Czechoslovakia, 1861-
2004. Vol. 1: The Period 1861-1938]. Brno 2005, 549. 
Heumos, Peter: Der Klabautermann und der lydische Hirte: Aus dem Schatzkästlein erbau­
licher Historie, In: Bohemia 39 (1998) 409-421, here 409. - It can be argued that to some 
extent, the Czech political elites did see the degree of democracy at home as contingent 
upon international support of the Czechoslovak Republic. 
Heumos, Peter: Thesen zur sozialgeschichtlichen Dimension eines Systemzusammen­
bruchs: Das Beispiel der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1938/39. In: Archiv für 
Sozialgeschichte 34 (1994) 55-61. - Idem: Strukturální prvky první československé republi­
ky: Politicko-společenský systém, intermediární organizace a problém stability [Structural 
Elements of the First Czechoslovak Republic: The Political-Social System, Intermediary 
Organizations, and the Problem of Stability]. In: Soudobé dějiny 2-3 (1995) 157-168. 
Rataj, Jan: O autoritativní národní stát: Ideologické proměny české politiky v druhé repu­
blice 1938-1939 [For an Authoritarian National State: The Ideological Changes of Czech 
Politics in the Second Republic]. Praha 1997, 234. - Similarly, and indirectly contradicting 
Harna (Harna: Stranickopolitický systém v Československu [cf. fn. 7]), Jan Hölzer has 
argued that one cannot explain the reduction of the party systém in the Second Republic 
through only the effects of Munich, as unifying processes had been visible since the mid-
1930s. Hölzer, Jan: Stranický systém druhé republiky [The Party System of the Second 
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Finally, even the Czech politicians in exile as well as the Opposition during the 
Second World War may be considered 'revisionists,' since after 1938 no one, Demo-
crat or Communist, wanted to return to the political systém of the First Republic. 
These reactions are a significant key to the understanding of Czech inter-war demo­
cracy. 
The Creation of the Political System 
The foundations of the Czechoslovak political systém were established shortly after 
the declaration of independence on October 28, 1918. On November 13, a Pro-
visional Constitution was announced and the foUowing day a Revolutionary 
National Assembly 'was established with 256 seats, of which 214 were distributed 
among the Czech political parties, while 40 were given to Slovák representatives and 
two reserved for the Czechoslovak legions. ' The Assembly immediately appointed 
an 'all-national' coalition government led by Karel Kramář and elected T. G. Ma­
saryk president. The Parliament and the President both claimed revolutionary legi-
timacy, and a fierce power conflict between the two characterized the foUowing peri­
od. At first the Parliament claimed absolute power - as reflected in the Provisional 
Constitution drafted mainly by the Social Democrat Alfréd Meissner - but the body 
was soon subjected to intense regimenting by the leaders of the Czech political par­
ties as well as the President, who on May 23, 1919 achieved a revision of the Con­
stitution that strengthened his powers considerably. The party leaders imposed their 
authority from the outset by appointing the members of the Revolutionary National 
Assembly, and they considered the seats in Parliament to be party property, a view-
point endorsed by the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly in April 
1919 when two Social Democrats defected from the party. The two were stripped of 
their mandates and replaced by other party members, a proceduře that undermined 
the independence and hence the authority of the Parliament.12 
This subjection of the Parliament was, according to Jiří Kunc, far from accidental: 
in a Situation where everything - statě borders and international recognition, the 
Republic]. In: Malíř, Jiří/Marek, Pavel (eds.): Politické strany: Vývoj politických stran a 
hnutí v českých zemích a Československu 1861-2004. Vol. 2: Období 1938-2004 [Political 
Parties: The Development of Political Parties and Movements in the Bohemian Lands and 
Czechoslovakia, 1861-2004. Vol. 2: The Period 1938-2004]. Brno 2005, 1039, see also 1054-
1055. 
The Czech seats were distributed according to the so-called Svehla key (named after the 
leading Agrarian politician Antonín Svehla), based on the results of the 1911 elections to the 
Austrian Reichsrat. The key was introduced in July 1918 when the domestic Czech politi­
cal leaders established the Czechoslovak National Committee. Actually, some of the Slovák 
seats were given to politically unaffiliated Czechs such as Edvard Beneš and Alice 
Masarykova, one of only eight women to enter the Parliament. See, Lipscher, Ladislav: 
Verfassung und politische Verwaltung in der Tschechoslowakei 1918-1939. München, Wien 
1979, 22-23 (VCC 34). - Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 52 (cf. fn. 2). - Peroutka, Ferdinand: 
Budování státu [The Building of the State]. Vol. 1. Praha 1933, 18-21, 259-262. 
Kárník: České země, vol. 1, 64 (cf. fn. 2). -Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 52-55, 60, 113-114 
(cf. fn. 2). - Klimek, Antonín: Boj o hrad, vol. 1: Hrad a Pětka [The Struggle for the Castle, 
vol. 1: The Castle and the Pětka]. Praha 1996, 33-36, 44-45. 
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attitude and the status of the minorities, even the political stance of the Czech and 
Slovák peoples - was in a flux 
[...] the structuring of the political systém is concentrated into a conflict about who defines the 
meaning of the statě as a whole, and concretely into a conflict between a party principle and an 
anti-party principle [stranictví a antistranictví], since the Parliament is not respected as a repre­
sentative of the generál will. 
Thus, the contest between President and parties determined the political shape of 
the new statě, but as Kunc points out, this was not just a power struggle between 
exile and home, or Masaryk and Kramář. It was also a clash of two very different 
conceptualizations of what Czech politics was about. The 'pillarization' (Versäu-
lung) of the Czech party systém was pronounced even before the war,14 and so the 
parties continued with a political culture of consensus-seeking in national questions 
among well organized, but socio-culturally segmented parties, each jealously guard-
ing its own 'territory' Traditionally, the parties also had a low respect for the 
Austrian representative institutions and saw themselves in Opposition to the head of 
the statě.15 Masaryk, by contrast, not only created the new Czechoslovak State in a 
revolutionary act, he also sought to revolutionize its soul in accordance with his own 
national philosophy. Politically, this led him to call for strong leadership - in 1919 
Masaryk flirted with the idea of an interim dictatorship with himself as dictator -
and to a wish to diminish the influence of the Czech parties, of which he was high-
ly sceptical.16 
Czech Democracy in Practice 1920-1938 
The fact that the Revolutionary National Assembly drafted and approved not only 
the Provisional, but also the 'real' Constitution of February 29, 1920 (and with it a 
number of related laws, including the highly important Language Law), is frequent-
ly cited as proof of a democratic deficit in the making of Czechoslovakia. The natio­
nal minorities were only brought into the political process at the parliamentary elec-
tions in April 1920, and their initial absence has led to much controversy, both about 
the democratic legitimacy of the statě - a controversy enhanced by the Preamble's 
reference to the 'Czechoslovak nation as the political subject passing the Consti­
tution 1 7 - and about who was to blame for the non-participation of the Germans in 
Kunc: Stranické systémy 168 (cf. fn. 4). 
Luft, Robert: Politischer Pluralismus und Nationalismus. Zu Parteiwesen und politischer 
Kultur in der tschechischen Nation vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. In: Österreichische Zeit­
schrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 3 (1991) 72-87, here 84-87. 
Kunc: Stranické systémy 170 (cf. fn. 4). 
Within his generál interpretation of the war as a conflict between democracy and theocra-
cy Masaryk found that modern democracies (USA and Great Britain) rationally operated 
with only two political parties, while letting people's individualism and subjectivism 
express itself in various churches and sects. In Catholic countries the state-supported 
church upheld a unity, while subjectivism found an unhealthy outlet in party politics, see 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 32-33, 106-107 (cf. fn. 12). - Also in 1919 (and indeed later!) 
Beneš called for a reduction of the number of political parties, and especially for the for-
mation of one 'socialist bloc' ibid.: 50, 101-103. 
Masaryk's old friend Jan Herben drafted the Preamble. It is evident from Herben's presen-
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particular. 1 8 But actually the w h o l e people of the n e w State, defined in § 1 of the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n as ' the o n l y source of all State p o w e r in the Czechos lovak Republ ic, ' 
was denied influence in its drafting; n o r did the Citizens of Czechoslovakia get the 
possibil ity to confirm or reject the C o n s t i t u t i o n in a later referendum, a un ique fea-
ture a m o n g the n e w states of Centra l and Eastern E u r o p e . 1 9 
O n e m a y well argue that the weakening of the Par l iament and the non-test ing of 
the p o p u l ä r will were political necessities in a chaotic Situation, in w h i c h domest ic 
stability was a p r e c o n d i t i o n for internat ional s u p p o r t and recognit ion, and that b o t h 
President and p a r t y leaders deserve praise for their willingness to c o m p r o m i s e and 
tation that 'Czechoslovak' was understood in an ethnic sense, see Peroutka, Ferdinand: 
Budování státu [The Building of the State]. Vol. 3. Praha 1936, 1446-1448. - Rádi, Emanuel: 
Válka Čechů s Němci [The War of the Czechs With the Germans]. Praha 1993 ( l s t edition 
1928), 125-127. -Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 147-148 (cf. fn. 2). - Broklova's attempt to 
present the phrase as parallel to similar phrases in the American and the French Con-
stitutions, which speak of the American or the French people in a clearly political and civic 
sense, is therefore unconvincing, see Broklová, Eva: První československá ústava: Diskuse 
v ústavním výboru v lednu a únoru 1920 [The First Czechoslovak Constitution: Discus-
sions in the Constitutional Committee in January and February 1920]. Praha 1992, 9. - See 
also Znoj, Milan: Demokracie a národní identita: český případ [Democracy and National 
Identity: The Czech Čase]. In: Moderní dějiny 2, Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století, Praha 
1994,41-51. 
Peter Burian expresses the conventional German perspective. In an article otherwise very 
favourable in its evaluation of the democratic principles embedded in the Constitution, he 
concludes that even the most scrupulously correct democratic systém could not repair the 
damage stemming from the injustice of the exclusion of the Germans from a share in its 
making, see Burian, Peter: Demokratie und Parlamentarismus in der Ersten Tschecho­
slowakischen Republik. In: Volkmann, Hans-Erich (ed.): Die Krise des Parlamentarismus 
in Ostmitteleuropa zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen. Marburg/L. 1967, 85-102, here 91, 
102. - See also Slapnicka, Helmut: Recht und Verfassung in der Tschechoslowakei 1918-
1938. In: Bosl, Karl (Hg.): Aktuelle Forschungsprobleme um die Erste Tschechoslowa­
kische Republik. München, Wien 1969, 93-112, here 98 (BWT 1). - Lipscher: Verfassung 
und politische Verwaltung 59-60 (cf. fn. 11). - Broklová, on the contrary, bluntly dismisses 
all such objections (repeating the opinions of Tusar and other Czech politicians from 
around 1920), and places all blame on the disloyal Germans, while Peroutka admits that in 
1920 most Czech parties had a strong interest in presenting the Germans with a fait accom-
pli. See Broklová, Eva: Československá demokracie: politický systém ČSR 1918-1938 
[Czechoslovak Democracy: The Political Systém of the CSR, 1918-1938]. Praha 1992, 23. -
Peroutka: Budování státu, vol. 3,1440 (cf. fn. 17). - Compare also with Kárník: České země, 
vol. 1, 90-101 (cf. fn. 2). - Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 147-148 (cf. fn. 2). - English and 
American accounts have tended to ignore the problém, or to see the exclusion of the 
Germans as a necessity or at most tactical error given the German unwillingness to recog-
nize the statě, see Wallace, William V: Czechoslovakia. London 1977, 144-150. - Beneš, 
Václav L.: Czechoslovak Democracy and Its Problems, 1918-1920. In: Mamatey/Luza: A 
History of the Czechoslovak Republic 95-98 (cf. fn. 1). - Mamatey, Victor S.: The Develop­
ment of Czechoslovak Democracy, 1920-1938. In: Mamatey/Luža: A History of the 
Czechoslovak Republic 173 (cf. fn. 1). - Rothschild: East Central Europe 93 (cf. fn. 5). -
Agnew, Hugh LeCaine: The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown. Stanford, 
California 2004, 178-180. 
Burian, Peter: Die neue Staat und seine Verfassung. In: Heumos, Peter/Lemberg, Hans 
(eds.): Das Jahr 1919 in der Tschechoslowakei und in Ostmitteleuropa. München 1993, 203-
214, here 209-212 (BWT 17). 
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their determinat ion to create a democrat ic political systém. But m a n y practices esta­
blished in these formative years cont inued even after the C o n s t i t u t i o n was passed 
and the political Situation stabilized, to the effect that political stability was secured 
at the expense of const i tut ional rules and democrat ic n o r m s . A certain tension be­
tween const i tut ional t h e o r y and political practice m a y be unavoidable, b u t in the 
Czechos lovak čase the offences against the letter of the C o n s t i t u t i o n were, in some 
respects, quite serious. O n e m a y talk of three k inds of offences. 
Firstly, there was the non-fulfilment of const i tut ional provis ions. T h e C o n s t i ­
tut ional C o u r t never functioned properly, and the seats in the C o u r t were even left 
vacant for seven years after 1931. 2 0 T h e Senate never came to play any independent 
role, 2 1 n o r was the inst i tut ion of the referendum ever ušed. 2 2 
Secondly, addit ional legislation restricted the civil rights guaranteed in the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . 2 3 A major restrictive act was the " L a w for the p r o t e c t i o n of the 
R e p u b l i c " of 1923, w h i c h - t h o u g h aimed at violent extremists and passed short ly 
after the assassination of Alois Rašín - wi th its vague, all-inclusive definitions of 
w h a t const i tuted an offence against the statě could be ušed against a n y o n e . 2 4 T h e 
Slapnicka: Recht und Verfassung 102 (cf. fn. 18). - Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 146 (cf. 
fn. 2). Compare to Broklová: Československá demokracie 47 (cf. fn. 18), or Kárník: České 
země, vol. 1, 102-103 (cf. fn. 2); both authors describe only what the Constitutional Court 
was meant to be and do, not its real fate. Curiously, Kárník ignores the Organization and 
functioning of the judicial systém in his otherwise very comprehensive history of the First 
Republic. 
The introduction of the Senate in the Constitution was controversial, and its eventual con-
struction did little to differentiate it from the Chamber of Deputies (both Chambers were 
elected by proportional vote). The Chamber of Deputies was elected for six years and the 
Senate for eight, but this provision was never respected. The issuing writs for elections to 
the Chamber of Deputies always resulted in the dissolution also of the Senate and simulta-
neous new elections. In this way, one avoided the inconvenience of having a different poli­
tical composition of the two Chambers; the wish to savé money also played a role! The 
Senate had few political competences and in the end it served mostly as a retreat for elder-
ly, second-rate, or worn-out politicians, see Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 
61-63 (cf. fn. 11). - Slapnicka: Recht und Verfassung 101 (cf. fn. 11). - Klimek: Velké ději­
ny, vol. 13, 142-143 (cf. fn. 2). - Broklová: Československá demokracie 31-33 (cf. fn. 18). 
According to Broklová, who quotes Peroutka, the politicians were convinced that they 
were more responsible and sensible than the disorganized people. Also Masaryk shared this 
scepticism about the political sensibility of ordinary people, see Broklová: Československá 
demokracie 34 (cf. fn. 18). - Slapnicka: Recht und Verfassung 98 (cf. fn. 18) gives further 
examples of such dead content in the Constitution. 
Slapnicka points out that in 1920 civic rights were often defined less liberally than in the Au-
strian Constitution of 1867, since the freedoms granted in the Czechoslovak Constitution 
were made conditional on further regulation by law. The author gives many examples of 
films, books, even songs, that were forbidden in inter-war Czechoslovakia, see Slapnicka, 
Helmut: Die Grundrechte des geistigen Lebens und die Zensur. In: Bosl, Kzu/Seibt, 
Ferdinand (eds.): Kultur und Gesellschaft in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. 
München 1982, 151-162 (BWT 10). 
For example saying that Czechoslovakia was a vassal of France, or that the Emperor was 
better than Masaryk became criminal offences, see Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 384-388 
(cf. fn. 2). - Kárník admits that this legislation "balanced on the edge of constitutionalism," 
adding that in the 1930s it was "insufficient" and thus twice tightened, but he does not 
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freedom of the press was steadily reduced, especially from 1933, and as one Czech 
National Socialist politician argued: "First is democracy, and only then comes the 
freedom of the press."2 5 'Democracy,' obviously, became synonymous with the exi-
sting State order, and the leading Czech parties did not hesitate to use democratical-
ly dubious means to protéct it. In October 1933, a law was passed that allowed for 
the dissolution of subversive political groups or parties. The law was used against 
only two Sudeten German, pro-Nazi parties in the immediate wake of its passing, 
but it remained democratically suspect: it empowered the government, and not the 
courts, to decide the legality of a party, giving the government a tool to change the 
composition of the Parliament and thereby create a majority at will. Only lack of 
consensus in the government saved the Communists or Henlein's Sudeten German 
Party from being banned.26 
The third type of violation of the letter and the spirit of the Constitution aimed to 
strengthen the executive - or the political parties - at the cost of the Parliament. The 
importance of the Parliament and its plenům was reduced by the creation of a 
'Permanent Committee' (stálý výbor; § 54 in the Constitution), a board of sixteen 
deputies and eight Senators which took over many of the National Assembly's com-
petences when the Parliament was not in Session. As a small organ it was easier to 
control and from 1920 forward, especially in the early 1930s it was used frequently, 
which further degraded the Parliament.27 Also, in clear contradiction with the Con-
stitution's § 22, a 1919 practice established that the seats in Parliament belonged to 
the parties and not to the elected deputies, so that these would lose their seats if they 
broke the party disciplině. This, of course, weakened the prestige of the deputies 
and made them totally dependent on the party leaders. Also, during elections the 
parties presented their candidates on 'fixed-order lists,' which made it impossible for 
the electorate to express individual preferences amongst these candidates. The par­
ties were allowed to arrange the lists used for distributing supplementary seats even 
after elections had been held, which amounted to a violation of the principle of 
direct elections. The combination of these restrictions and compulsory voting made 
reflect further upon the consequences of this for the quality of democracy in the First 
Republic, see Kárník: České země, vol. 1, 234-236 (cf. fn. 2). 
Quoted from Slapnicka: Die Grundrechte des geistigen Lebens 161 (cf. fn 23). 
Paradoxically, this was the only law that regulated the legal status of political parties. The 
parties were not mentioned in the Constitution, or even regulated by law. See Lipscher: 
Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 109-112, 155-157 (cf. fn. 11). -Klimek: Velké dějiny, 
vol. 14, 265-267 (cf. fn. 2). - Kárník: České země, vol. 2, 137-140 (cf. fn. 2). 
Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 191 (cf. fn. 2). 
This practice was confirmed by a decision of the Electoral Court in 1923. Most members of 
the Electoral Court were appointed by the political parties, however, so that a decision in 
favour of the parties was close to inevitable. All parties agreed to these measures, but as the 
decision of the Electoral Court was challenged by lawyers, the parties instead began to 
force their candidates before elections to write undated declarations giving up their manda-
tes. The party leadership could use them at any moment, then, see Lipscher: Verfassung und 
politische Verwaltung 112-114 (cf. fn. 11). - Beneš: Czechoslovak Democracy and Its 
Problems 98 (cf. fn. 18). —Klimek, Antonín: Počátky parlamentní činnosti v Českosloven­
sku. In: Parlamentní zpravodaj 9 (1997) 449-451. 
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elections appear 'mechanical, ' and led to a loss of political interest wi th in the gene­
rál publ ic . 2 9 
T h e cabinet was often reorganized, b u t due t o the national and political compos i­
t ion of the Par l iament there was never any prospect of a genuine change of guard 
a m o n g government and Opposition. Rothschi ld points out : 
Though the electorate four times denied the outgoing coalition an ongoing majority, the poli­
tical consequences were relatively trifling, the chronic government parties considering them-
selves more-or-less immune to effective electoral retribution. 
T h e government therefore consistently ignored all suggestions from the Opposi­
t ion and int roduced several regulations that made difficult the w o r k of the Opposi­
t ion in Parl iament. T h e Opposition then t u r n e d t o shout ing or o ther forms of o b -
struct ion or sealed itself in lethargic passivity.3 1 Parallels t o the pre-war Austr ian 
Par l iament can certainly be drawn. 
T h e Par l iament was thus unable to challenge the government in any way, b u t in 
1933 some government parties found it inconvenient and t ime-consuming t o consult 
Par l iament at all, and so in J u n e - after m u c h controversy in the governing coalit ion 
- they passed a so-called A u t h o r i z i n g Bili', w h i c h author ized the government to 
make various economic decisions dur ing the wor ld-wide economic crisis. T h e 
Agrarians were the chief architects of the law, w h i c h they used t o improve their posi-
t ion in the coalit ion and to attack the Social D e m o c r a t s : one of the first government 
decrees lowered u n e m p l o y m e n t reliéf, and from 1933 agricultural policies were con-
ducted almost exclusively b y decrees. 3 2 O n Agrarian initiative, the bili was repeated-
Broklová: Československá demokracie 79-83 (cf. fn. 18). 
Rothschild: East Central Europe 135 (cf. fn. 5). 
3 1 Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 518-520 (cf. fn. 2). - Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 239-240 
(cf. fn. 2). - Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 129-133 (cf. fn. 11). - In 1933, 
obstruction from the German nationalist parties particularly brought the government to 
change the parliamentary Standing Orders, so that deputies deemed to be obstructing could 
be excluded and physically removed from the negotiations in Parliament. Kárník admits 
that this step represented a "considerable curtailment of parliamentary freedom," but he 
considered the step necessary "if the Parliament was not to be put out of Operation," see 
Kárník: České země, vol. 2, 137 (cf. fn. 2). - Yet the problém was that the only 'Operation' 
left for Parliament in 1933 was to rubber-stamp decisions made elsewhere, with the Oppo­
sition excluded. 
The Agrarians and the National Socialists pushed very hard to get this law passed. 
Originally, they even suggested that the authorization should be given to the President and 
the Premier only (at that time Jan Malypetr, an Agrarian), an idea also supported by 
Masaryk. The National Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the People's Party were 
reluctant to support the law, especially the 'narrow authorization,' and expressed their fear 
of Agrarian authoritarian intentions. As the People's Party argued, authorization should be 
given to the whole government (this eventually became the case), though this would again 
be superfluous since the Parliament obediently followed cabinet Orders regardless, see 
Klimek: Velké dějiny XIV 231-239 (cf. fn. 2).-Kárník: České země, vol. 2, 82-85 (cf. fn. 2). 
- Trapl, Miloš: Political Catholicism and the Czechoslovak People's Party in Czecho­
slovakia 1918-1938. New York 1995, 80. - Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 
151-154 (cf. fn. 11). - In formal terms, the Parliament had the right to convene within 14 
days to object to the decrees. Given the strict party control of the parliamentary majority 
this of course never happened. 
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ly renewed until 1937, and its scope widened to the point at which government 
decrees could replace existing legislation (according to many Czech legal experts this 
amounted to a violation of the Constitution). The government thus assumed a legis-
lating function at the cost of the Parliament, and in 1933 the Agrarians and the 
National Socialists openly argued that the Parliament was too clumsy an institution, 
technically and politically, to serve the needs of the time. As Emil Franke, a leading 
Czech National Socialist, put it, "our democracy is suitable for normal conditions, 
quiet times [klid], and relative wealth. If conditions are extraordinary, one cannot 
exclude equally extraordinary measures."33 
In sum, the democratically-elected Czechoslovak Parliament was, from the begin-
ning, deliberately weakened to the point at which it could not serve as a forum for 
any real political decision-making, and in 1933 the government found means to 
avoid the trouble of hearing it at all. Even Broklová has admitted that it never attai-
ned any "significant shape or function" and that it "looked most like a voting machi­
ne" for decisions made elsewhere.34 Thus, the Parliament was never used as a demo­
cratic instrument for conflict regulation, and this has led Heumos to suggest that the 
stability of Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy was facilitated by its never 
having been exposed to the bürden of true responsibility!35 As seen, even the judi-
ciary's authority to serve as a guardian of democratic constitutionality was reduced 
to insignificance, and so the fate of Czech democracy was solely in the hands of the 
executive, i. e. the government (and the parties behind) and the President. 
The Parties and the Pětka 
Around 1920-1921 (and anticipated since 1918), the so-called Pětka (Group of 
Five) established itself, an unofficial group of top politicians from the five major 
Czech parties, the Agrarians; the National Democrats; the People's Party; the Social 
Quoted from Hradilák, Zdeněk: Československá sociální demokracie a zmocňovací zákon 
v roce 1933 [The Czechoslovak Social Democracy and the Authorization Bill in 1933]. In: 
Příspěvky k dějinám KSC 7 (1967) 29-51, here 42. — Opinions differ greatly on the impor-
tance and function of the law. Broklová claims that it was a mere technical measure aimed 
at defending democracy without any intent to side-track the Parliament; see Broklová: Čes­
koslovenská demokracie 112-113 (cf. fn. 18). - Heumos, on the other hand, finds that par­
liamentary democracy in Czechoslovakia was thrown overboard with this law, see Heumos, 
Peter: Die Entwicklung organisierter agrarischer Interessen in den böhmischen Ländern 
und in der ČSR. Zur Entstehung und Machtstellung der Agrarpartei 1873-1938. In: Bosl, 
Karl (ed.): Die Erste Tschechoslowakische Republik als multinationaler Parteienstaat. 
München, Wien 1979, 323-376, here 373 (BWT 9). - Lipscher, in between, is somewhat 
contradictory. He insists that the law was not undemocratic, since the Parliament could still 
exert its rights, while also ascribing its passing to the growing influence of right-wing par­
ties seeking to curtail democracy, see Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 153-
154 (cf. fn. 11). - Klimek ends his presentation by stressing that "[...] in contrast to certain 
other states it did not come to an abuse of the Authorization Laws in Czechoslovakia" (see 
Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 14, 239 [cf. fn. 2]), without, however, defining what, in his opi-
nion, constitutes 'abuse.' 
Broklová: Československá demokracie 46 (cf. fn. 18). 
Heumos, Peter: Konfliktregelung und soziale Integration: Zur Struktur der Ersten Tsche­
choslowakischen Republik. In: Bohemia 30 (1989), 52-70, here 68. 
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D e m o c r a t s ; and the N a t i o n a l Socialists (represented b y A n t o n í n Svehla, Alois Rašín, 
Jan Šrámek, Rudolf Bechyně, and Jiří Stř íbrný respectively). In 1922 Bechyně 
explained the raison ďětre of the Pětka: the conflict potential in Par l iament had to 
be reduced, since the national and social compos i t ion of the Czechos lovak statě 
made these conflicts "deeper and m o r e dangerous than elsewhere." T h e Parl iament 
needed s t rong leadership, for " w i t h o u t the Pětka, Parl iament w o u l d become a dispu-
tatious body, in w h i c h reasonable politics w o u l d be replaced b y d e m a g o g y . " 3 6 T h e 
goal of the Pětka was to make governance efficient b y reaching binding political 
compromises and securing a majority for t h e m in Parl iament. In deep secrecy (no 
members ever t o o k notes) the five m e n decided w h a t issues to p u t on the political 
agenda (and w h i c h ones t o exclude), as well as w h a t to d o wi th them. T h e Petka's 
ability to obta in results m a d e it the most powerful political s t ructure in the country, 
Controlling n o t just the Parl iament, b u t also the government . 
Initially, the Pětka had Masaryk's support , b u t later the Hrad m a d e several 
a t tempts to weaken it and curtail the influence of the parties. To keep a balance bet­
ween the two, the t radi t ion of hearing Masaryk o n all bills before they were pass­
ed in Par l iament was in t roduced t o Supplement the Petka's 'pre-screening' of the 
political agenda. 3 7 T h e p o w e r struggle between the Hrad and the parties was often 
intense and the means employed were n o t always kosher, b u t especially f rom the 
mid-1930s onwards , w h e n foreign threats against the Republ ic grew, the t w o sides 
reduced their attacks against each other, and a k ind of stalemate set in . 3 8 
P e r o u t k a and m a n y other observers have given the Pětka a favourable evaluation, 
finding the disciplině imposed necessary in the given historical context . 3 9 K u n c calls 
the Pětka an early example of consociational democracy and the only alternative to 
non-democrat ic Solutions as in Italy or Spain. H e also points o u t that the almost 
welfare-state-like Cooperation between socially antagonistic political actors was dic-
tated by a wish t o keep G e r m a n s and Slovaks, and Fascists and C o m m u n i s t s , away 
Quoted from Peroutka, Ferdinand: Budování státu [The Building of the State]. Vol. 4. Praha 
1936,2166. 
Broklová, Eva: Masarykova sociálně etická dimense demokracie. In: Broklová, Eva (ed.): 
Sto let Masarykovy české otázky [One hundred years of Masaryk's The Czech Question]. 
Praha 1997, 188-196, here 192. 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 174-175 (cf. fn. 12). The original Pětka ceased to exist in 1926, 
but it was replaced later by committees of six or eight members (depending on the number 
of coalition partners) with similar functions, but mostly with less power. 
Broklová recognizes that both government and Parliament merely took Orders from the 
Pětka, but she maintains that this represented only a generál trend in 'modern democracy' 
towards oligarchization and towards a reduction of the role of the Parliament. The Pětka 
was thus crucial to the preservation of Czechoslovak democracy and Broklová claims (with 
only a reference to Beneš) that similar organs could be found in many other countries, see 
Broklová: Československá demokracie 45-46 (cf. fn. 18). If one were to také Broklova's 
logic to the extreme, one would have to conclude that an ultimately modern democracy has 
no use at all for a Parliament, and that the regimes of 1945 and then 1948 and after in this 
respect represented progressions in modernity. - Miller by contrast argues (unfortunately 
without any supporting references) that the Pětka did not dictate terms to the National 
Assembly, as it cooperated with a 'Pětka of Deputies' representing the coalition parties in 
Parliament, see Miller: Forging Political Compromise 78 (cf. fn. 1). 
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from the main decision making, and that a price was paid in terms of the inade-
quately functioning democratic institutions.40 Klimek too ends his essentially favou-
rable account by stressing that the activities of the Pětka (and the Hrad) represent­
ed a necessary trade-off, sacrificing some of democracy's purity in order to save it.41 
But as pointed out by particularly Peter Heumos, a certain democratic deficit was 
not the only problém arising from this political arrangement. Pětka policies were 
often the outcome of pure horse trading among the parties, a quid pro quo that made 
it difficult to develop a coherent political line or impose grand Solutions. The parties 
bought stability at the expense of flexibility and efficiency, as no change could be 
enforced if it threatened the multifarious interests of the ruling cartel of parties. 
Thus, the Pětka was unable or unwilling to put many serious problems on the agen­
da; for instance, Heumos ascribes the lack of regional economic equalizing and 
the neglect of the social dimension of the 'Slovák problém' to this inability to cut 
through cronyism.42 
Furthermore, the parties divided different ministries among themselves, and came 
to consider 'their' ministries as party property, to be manned by party members. A 
similar process took place in the local civil Service, in banks, insurance companies, 
health insurance societies etc., so that the main parties possessed their own institu­
tions encompassing all aspects of the social welfare of its members. In 1938 Peroutka 
called Czechoslovak democracy "the most organized democracy in the world, and 
its political parties [...] the most disciplined."43 But this extreme degree of Organiza­
tion was not unequivocally a democratic asset. The profound pillarization of socie­
ty ensured that the parties (including their trade unions and other social Organiza­
t i o n ) spent much energy consolidating and protecting their domains, and often they 
wore themselves down in the struggle for self-preservation. If interest representation 
is functional only when aggregated and monopolized to a degree that gives it politi­
cal resonance, the Czechoslovak systém of fragmented over-organization may be 
said to have been dysfunctional. This may also be a key to the rapid and complete 
coUapse of this systém after 1938. 
It has been argued that this disaggregation of social conflicts was, to some extent, 
a deliberate stratégy from the leading parties, especially as a means against the labour 
movement. 4 But the prize for 'solving' conflicts by atomizing them was a failing 
Kunc: Stranické systémy 169-171 (cf. fn. 4). 
Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 244-245 (cf. fn. 2). - Kárník calls the devaluation of the 
Parliament that followed from the Pětka rule "[...] a high tax Czechoslovak democracy had 
to pay so shortly after being introduced, a survival tax", see Kárník: České země, vol. 1, 142 
(cf. fn. 2). 
Two examples from Heumos: in 1926 Agrarians and the People's Democrats traded an 
increase in priests' salaries for the introduction of agricultural customs; and in 1930 the 
Agrarians and the Social Democrats traded import restrictions on cucumbers for a higher 
dole, see Heumos: Konfliktregelung und soziale Integration 56-57 (cf. fn. 35). 
Peroutka, Ferdinand: A Portrait of Czechoslovak Democracy. In: Čapek, Karel et al.: At 
the Cross-Roads of Europe: A Historical Outline of the Democratic idea in Czecho­
slovakia. Praha 1938, 247-275, here 274. 
Heumos: Konfliktregelung und soziale Integration 61-64 (cf. fn. 35). - Shaw, Jackson: 
Massenorganisationen und parlamentarische Demokratie. In: Bosl, Karl (ed.): Die demo-
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'state-mindedness' (státotvornost) in the population, a lack of interest in the generál 
political make-up of the statě. People spent political energies in the microcosms of 
the many party organizations, while generál democratic integration, i. e. participa-
tion or interest in broader political issues, was low.45 
The political heritage of the Habsburg era also contributed to this socio-political 
fragmentation. The central parliamentary institutions of Austria, the Reichsrat and 
the Diets, never functioned effectively as forums for political integration and interest 
aggregation, and they were met with considerable Czech scepticism and at times 
even boycotts. Instead, national Czech politics (and ideology) to a high degree cent-
red on local self-organization, resulting in a diverse civil society, bound together as 
much by national ideology as by institutional structures. The two-tiered systém of 
local government established in 1862 facilitated this process, but the limited curial 
franchise at all levels (except from 1907 for the Reichsrat) and the parallel functio-
ning of a supervising statě bureaucracy exempted from public participation or con-
trol, again acted as barriers to any mass involvement or interest in representative 
rule. Political structures and the communitarian, self-governmental, personalized 
and consensus-seeking Czech political culture thus both contributed to upholding a 
boundary between the local (meaningful and relevant) and the national (remote and 
irrelevant) political strata. 
Even internally within the parties this lack of dynamism made itself felt. The 
various party leaderships were, Rothschild argues, stuck in "oligarchical and pater-
nalistic rigidity," and nothing was doně to "involve the younger generations in poli­
tical responsibilities." The failed rejuvenation of the parties was reflected also in the 
composition of the Parliament: in 1920 the average age of its membership was 42.6 
years; in 1935 it was 45.6, and without the Sudeten German Party a füll 65.4 years! 
In the parties, the youth organizations responded to this Stagnation with calls for 
political reform, often in radical, anti-democratic directions. Corporatist ideas, at 
times inspired by Italian fascism, were broadly populär, and many projects either 
aimed to replace parliamentary democracy with a more 'efficienť form of rule based 
on a corporate representation of economic interests, or called for a comprehensive 
unification of society by means of forced political and social integration and strong 
leadership.48 This ideological confusion also affected the party elites, and some scho-
kratisch-parlamentarische Struktur der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. München 
Wien 1975, 35-52, here 47-52 (BWT 7). 
Heumos: Konfliktregelung und soziale Integration 58-59 (cf. fn. 35). 
Rothschild: East Central Europe 135 (cf. fn. 5). - Kárník reaches much the samé conclu-
sions, see Kárník: České země, vol. 2, 80-82, 350-352, and vol. 3, 494-496 (cf. fn. 2). 
Broklová: Československá demokracie 84 (cf. fn. 18). 
Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 161-168 (cf. fn. 11). -Klimek, Antonín: Boj 
o hrad, vol. 2: Kdo po Masarykovi? 1926-1935 [The Struggle for the Castle, vol. 2: Who 
After Masaryk? 1926-1935]. Praha 1998, 366-373. -Heumos, Peter: Pluralistische Macht­
organisation als Garant der Demokratie? Zur Struktur und zum autoritären Potential der 
Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. In: Oberländer, Erwin et al. (eds.): Autoritäre 
Regime in Ostmitteleuropa 1919-1944. Mainz 2001, 136-139, here 139. - These develop­
ments and intra-party disagreements make Olivova's division of the Czechoslovak parties 
into three camps - republican, nationalist, and communist - in which nearly all Czech par-
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lars have seen the Agrarian c o m m i t m e n t to the existing order as a reflection of the 
party 's belief that it could secure its interests wi th in the systém (cf. the A u t h o r i z i n g 
Bill), rather than as a clear ideological c o m m i t m e n t to democracy. T h e Social D e m o ­
crats (and the Hrad factions in the other parties) were increasingly pushed t o the 
defensive,4 9 and it m a y be argued that o n l y the generally perceived need to stand 
together in defence of a political o r d e r that enjoyed the s u p p o r t of the country ' s 
main Western allies prevented a change of the political systém in a less democrat ic 
direction. D e v e l o p m e n t s from O c t o b e r 1938 s u p p o r t this hypothesis . 
T h u s , the final assessment of the C z e c h inter-war p a r t y systém has often been 
negative. George K e n n a n described the c o m m o n view vividly in 1939: 
For many years the Czech political parties have sat around the board and split any and all poli­
tical spoils with the exactitude of small boys dividing a stolen melon. Their preoccupation with 
the relative size of their share, rather than with the extent of what was there to divide, has been 
one of the contributing factors in the catastrophe which has overcome the nation. 
A m o n g the C z e c h elites, the need to reform the p a r t y systém b y reducing the 
n u m b e r of parties was feit equally, therefore, b y the r ight-wing representatives of the 
Second Republ ic at h o m e , and b y Beneš and his centrist and left-wing supporters in 
exile in L o n d o n . 5 1 
The Hrad 
Kunc, however, does p o i n t t o one i m p o r t a n t line of defence for the \>a.rty-Pětka 
systém: it formed a decent counterbalance to the Hrad-óxúe., and t o the Hrad's poli­
tical engineering at the expense of the established political systém. 5 2 Kl imek also 
appreciates this balance, and finds that the Hrad was correct in its scepticism of the 
ties fall in the republican (i. e. democratic) camp, highly problematic, see Olivová: The 
Czechoslovak Government 90-93 (cf. fn. 4). 
See Kuklik, Jan: Programový vývoj Československé sociálně demokratické strany dělnické 
za první republiky [The Development in the Programme of the Czechoslovak Social 
Democratic Workers' Party During the First Republic]. In: Marek, Pavel (ed.): Současný 
stav a perspektivy zkoumání politických stran na našem uzemí [The Contemporary State 
and the Perspectives for the Study of Political Parties on our Territory]. Olomouc 1999, 64-
79, here 72-74, on reform plans in the Social Democratic Party and the leadership's inabili-
ty to respond thereto. 
Kennan, George: From Prague After Munich - Diplomatie Papers 1938-1940. Princeton, 
New Jersey 1968, 99. 
Significantly, in evaluations of the political systém of the First Republic Edward Táborský 
and others eriticized less the Pětka systém (i. e. the systém of pre-negotiating and deciding 
the political agenda without parliamentary control), than the excessive number of parties 
which made decision-making too complicated, see Táborský, Edward: Czechoslovak 
Democracy at Work. London 1945, 94-101, 104-106, 156-157. This line of critique focuses 
more on making the political systém more efficient than on demoeratizing it. See also Beneš, 
Edvard: Demokracie dnes a zítra [Democracy Today and Tomorrow]. Praha 1945 (1999 
edn.), 274-283. Beneš calls here for a reduction of the number of political parties in order 
to make democracy healthier. 
Kunc: Stranické systémy 168-169 (cf. fn. 4). Kunc stresses how this kind of elitist political 
engineering, even when conducted with democratic intentions, can backlash easily if at 
odds with the given political systém. The Catholic revenge-taking against Masarykism and 
the Slovaks against the First Republic in 1938-39 are just two examples of this mechanism. 
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somewhat mediocre and moral ly dubious pragmat i sm of the Pětka, w h i c h was 
equally correct in fearing the elitism of the Hrad: 
The essentially permanently revolutionary Hrad actually longed to impute a 'strong,' ideal 
democracy to the statě by means of an enlightened leader - the President. The Pětka opted for 
pragmatism. It feared that the leader could turn into a dictator - be it the most enlightened 
one. 
T h e Hrad (Castle) is an ambiguous term. Masaryk's critics in t roduced it in the 
early 1920s t o refer t o an influential g roup of people b o t h suppor t ing and s u p p o r t -
ed by the President, b u t later his followers adopted it, and eventually even Masaryk 
himself.5 4 T h e Hrad can be defined as a flexible, b u t at its core stable conglomerate 
of politicians, civil servants, businessmen, journalists, intellectuals and other people 
of influence, adhering to the President, his p h i l o s o p h y and worldview, and his poli­
tical practice. 5 5 
Masaryk strove t o have his ideas of democracy realized in the First Republic, and 
in stark contrast to the part ies ' wish for a pure ly representative pres ident he de-
m a n d e d a s t rong pres idency along American lineš. T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1920 thus 
represented a c o m p r o m i s e in sharing the executive p o w e r between the Cabinet and 
the President. T h e Par l iament elected the President for a seven-year term. While the 
President could be re-elected o n l y once, an exception was made exclusively for 
Masaryk (§ 58). T h e President had n o legislative initiative, but he could refuse to sign 
a law and send it back to Parl iament wi th his c o m m e n t s . If an absolute majority pas­
sed the law again, it w o u l d come into force (§ 64/5, § 47 and 48). § 66 held that the 
Cabinet, and n o t the President, was responsible for the acts of the latter in the exe-
cut ion of his office,56 while § 68 stipulated that any governmental or executive act b y 
the President had t o be counters igned b y the responsible minister. T h e President also 
had some very i m p o r t a n t prerogatives, including the right t o appoint and dismiss 
ministers, including the P r i m e Minister (§ 64/7, § 70); t o dissolve the Par l iament 
(§ 64/4, § 31); and to appoint various groups of civil servants (§ 64/8). Masaryk used 
these rights t o contro l first and foremost the ministries of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs, b o t h of w h i c h he considered to be his private d o m a i n . 5 7 N o r did he hesitate 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 179 (cf. fn. 12). Klimek continues: "The activities of the Hrad 
and the Pětka were beneficial to the preservation of democracy in the statě; but the methods 
that they used [...] detracted some carats from the purity of this democracy." 
Firt, Julius: Die „Burg" aus der Sicht eines Zeitgenossen. In: Bosl, Karl (ed.): Die „Burg" -
Einflußreiche Kräfte um Masaryk und Beneš. Vol. 1, München, Wien 1973, 85-108, here 85 
(BWT 5). - Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 165 (cf. fn. 12). 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 164-176 (cf. fn. 12). - The Hrad was first discussed systemati-
cally in Bosl, Karl (ed.): Die „Burg". - Einflußreiche Kräfte um Masaryk und Beneš. 2 vols., 
München, Wien 1973, 1974 (cf. fn. 54). - See also Kárník: České země, vol. 1, 407-416 (cf. 
fn. 2). - Alain Soubigou, by contrast, doubts that any such influence group ever existed, cal-
ling it evil rumours spread by opponents of Masaryk. The fact that in 1922 Masaryk him­
self denied that there was anything like a Hrad group settles the matter for the author, see 
Soubigou, Alain: Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. Praha, Litomyšl 2004, 268-270. 
Lipscher quotes František Weyr, one of the authors of the Constitution, as calling § 66 a 
rudiment of the idea of monarchical inviolability, a 'the King can do no wrong' logic. 
Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 74 (cf. fn. 11). 
5 7 Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 84, 98 (cf. fn. 12). 
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to veto the a p p o i n t m e n t of ministers w h o were n o t to his liking, and he clearly pre-
ferred people from the Hrad-fact ions of the parties. 
Immediate ly after his r e t u r n to Prague, Masaryk began creating a Chancel lery of 
the President of the Republ ic (Kancelář Prezidenta Republiky, KPR), regulated by 
law in D e c e m b e r 1919 after a fierce strife wi th the Parl iament, w h o did n o t w a n t any 
'parallel g o v e r n m e n t . ' 5 8 T h e KPR became a sizable and influential Institution, and 
Masaryk repeatedly appointed leading staff m e m b e r s of the KPR as ministers. 
T h e President - and his Foreign Minister - had considerable funds at their dispo-
sal, w h i c h t h e y used extensively t o secure their influence. T h e y s u p p o r t e d or con-
trolled a n u m b e r of dailies and Journals in Czechoslovakia and abroad, cultural and 
educational societies, publishers, etc. 5 9 Masaryk and Beneš also intervened directly 
in p a r t y politics, suppor t ing pro-Hrad people or factions, or directly buying the 
s y m p a t h y or allegiance of individual politicians or w h o l e part ies . 6 0 If suppor t , or bri-
bery, was the carrot, the Hrad also had its stick: In 1922 Masaryk and Beneš created 
their o w n extensive intelligence Services (financed from their funds), w h i c h kept the 
Hrad well informed about all activities in the political part ies. 6 1 Masaryk did n o t 
hesitate to collect and publ i sh c o m p r o m i s i n g materiál o n political o p p o n e n t s (inclu­
ding medical reports ! ) , and the Service was a formidable and m u c h feared tool for 
securing the interests of the Hrad. B e y o n d doubt , Masaryk and Beneš personal ly 
despised the widespread, p e t t y c o r r u p t i o n of C z e c h politics and publ ic life, and 
Masaryk sincerely propagated high Standards of decency as a sine qua non for a 
democrat ic society. T h e y used the w h o l e systém of br ibery and spying n o t for per­
sonal profit, b u t for the good of the State, wi th w h i c h b o t h m e n uncondi t ional ly 
identified their o w n pos i t ion. 6 2 Still, the incessant use of such m e t h o d s had to have a 
corrupt ing impact o n the political culture of the country . 6 3 
Ibid. 76-84 (cf. fn. 12). - See also Soubigou: Tomáš Garrique Masaryk 249-268 (cf. fn. 55) 
for a useful presentation of the structure and leading staff of the KPR. 
In 1930, the Parliament even gave Masaryk 20 million crowns in celebration of his eigh-
teenth birthday, see Kárník: České země, vol. 2, 71 (cf. fn. 2). - Masaryk also spent large 
sums of his private fortuně on charity, see Soubigou: Tomáš Garrique Masaryk 280 (cf. 
fn. 55). - O n Masaryk, the Hrad, and journalism, see Orzoff, Andrea: "The Literary Organ 
of Politics": Tomáš Masaryk and Political Journalism, 1925-1929. In: Slavic Review 63 
(2004) 2, 275-300. - Idem: Battle for the Castle: The Friday Men and the Czechoslovak 
Republic, 1918-1938. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2000. 
Examples of these practices are legion in Klimek's well-documented accounts. Klimek 
includes a hilarious example of how in 1925 the Hrad sought to win the Czech Small 
Traders' Party (Živnostenská strana) for their policies. The party leaders, whom Masaryk 
found particularly corrupt and primitive, immediately made gross economic demands and 
were willing to do almost anything demanded of them in return, see Klimek: Boj o hrad, 
vol. 1, 319-320 (cf. fn. 12). - In the end the Hrad preferred to set up its own party, the 
'National Labour Party' (Národní strana práce), but it was totally unsuccessful at the sub-
sequent elections. 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 82-83 (cf. fn. 12). - Hradilák: Československá sociální demo­
kracie 39 (cf. fn. 33). 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 87, 98 (cf. fn. 12). "The Castle identified itself with democracy 
itself; thus any blow against the Castle, or more concretely against Masaryk and Beneš, 
could be construed as a blow against democracy itself [...]". - Orzoffi Battle for the Castle 
7 (cf. fn. 59). 
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T h e extensive use of the intelligence Service suggests a low interest in or respect 
for the formal and legal aspects of democracy, also visible in o t h e r initiatives b y 
Masaryk while in office.6 4 At several occasions Masaryk had 'expert cabinets ' install-
ed wi th only limited p a r t y part icipation, and w h e n planning the c o m p o s i t i o n of the 
cabinets he did n o t feel part icularly b o u n d b y the compos i t ion of the Parl iament. 
O n e example must suffice t o illustrate h o w Masaryk, and wi th h im other key m e m ­
bers of the C z e c h political elites, approached the p r o b l é m of democrat ic representa-
t ion: in 1925 the Pětka and the Hrad feared that the impending elections w o u l d 
result in an unfavourable compos i t ion of the Parl iament. B o t h groups therefore con­
sidered letting the President issue a n e w election bili b y decree (oktroj), w h i c h w o u l d 
secure a positive result. These plans included depriving soldiers of their vot ing rights, 
since they voted for the C o m m u n i s t s in great numbers , and also w o m e n , w h o m they 
alleged to s u p p o r t clerical p a r t i e s ! 6 5 
Given Masaryk's indisputable c o m m i t m e n t t o democrat ic ideals, one might feel 
t e m p t e d t o explain these manoeuvres as a p r o d u c t of an inevitable discrepancy be­
tween lofty rhetor ic and profane 'Realpolitik.' But Masaryk's behaviour was fully 
justifiable b y his o w n p h i l o s o p h y of democracy. Masaryk held that all politics m u s t 
When the Communists in 1945 established a similar intelligence Service in all parties and 
sectors of society, they had domestic precedents! Kárník seems ambiguous in his evaluation 
of the Hrad methods: "The formation of the Hrad basically proceeded democratically. But 
the methods used were diverse, and among them even those were not missing, which we 
must consider inappropriate, such as nepotism and the formation of personal and group 
positions. But they were not strong enough to blemish the democratic character of this 
power centre. On the other hand the Hrad was in a way a natural sign of the era's Czecho­
slovak democracy, which (still) wasn't capable of disengaging itself from monarchist fee-
lings and medieval traditions." Kárník: České země, vol. 1,416 (cf. fn. 2). - Whereas Kárník 
finds medieval leftovers in Hrad proceedings, and blames their presence on 'the times' rat­
her than on the power centre itself, holding that it was too democratic to be blemished by 
its own undemocratic methods(!?), Soubigou is incapable of seeing any problems at all in 
the methods of the KPR (substituting for the Hrad, the existence of which he does not 
recognize), which he evaluates very positively: "[...] the practices of the KPR moved from 
the era of political trickery inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the era of 
an Anglo-Saxon pragmatism of pressure groups, which obtain their power through their 
ability to inform those who decide, before they make their decisions." Soubigou: Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk 260 (cf. fn. 55). - But Masaryk and the KPR did not represent any soci­
al, economic or other interest group outside the political systém, they were the ones in 
power, and they used this power to manipulate the democratically elected Parliament and 
the parties to obtain an influence far exceeding the Presidenťs constitutional powers. 
Szporluk claims with only slight exaggeration: "The only institutional aspect of democracy 
which interested Masaryk was his rights as president of the new Czechoslovak republic." 
Szporluk, Roman: Masaryk's Idea of Democracy. In: The Slavonic and East European Re­
view 41 (1962) 31-49, here 45. 
Ideas about depriving 'problematic' groups of their voting rights already circulated in 1923, 
and they resurfaced in 1926 when it proved difficult to construe a parliamentary majority 
to form new government. The electoral systém was described in the Constitution, and it 
was considered impossible to find a qualified majority for a reform of it, hence the plans to 
circumvent the Parliament, see Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 301, 316-317 (cf. fn. 12). -
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 2, 25-27 (cf. fn. 48). - Klimek: Velké dějiny, vol. 13, 525-534 (cf. fn. 
2). 
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be based on a phi losophy, an 'idea,' and he believed that h u m a n values and social 
aims were ul t imately h a r m o n i o u s . Politics therefore essentially consisted of phi lo-
sophically defining these aims and scientifically reaüzing them, w h i c h m a d e ques-
tions of p o p u l ä r contro l and mechanisms of pluralistic checks and balances less 
pert inent . Masaryk's agenda was n o t so m u c h the l imitat ion of p o w e r as the opt imal 
realization of it . 6 6 Inst i tut ional ly this n o t only led to a lasting scepticism towards 
parties, w h o s e part icularism had to appear as dubious from the perspective of one 
universal, objective ' good, ' 6 7 b u t also to the pos i t ion that the value of the par l iament 
or o ther democrat ic inst i tut ions depended o n their ability to reach the morally, 
philosophically, and scientifically r ight conclusions. If they couldn ' t , s o m e b o d y eise 
had t o d o it. At heart, this is a p h i l o s o p h y for the end of politics, a call for its being 
replaced b y administrat ion. T h e dist inct ion between statě and society also loses its 
importance, and freedom means free to part icipate in the realization of the c o m m o n 
good. 6 8 F o r ord inary people, democracy becomes educat ion and w o r k , a socializa-
t ion process, not any direct, active part ic ipat ion in the r u n n i n g of society: 
Now, what does it mean to be a democrat, politically, socially, economically, in public life? It 
means to work. Democratization will take place when men, in their respective spheres, beco-
me industrious, become true workers and labour with conviction and conscientiously. 
Masaryk's p h i l o s o p h y of democracy also u p h o l d s a s t rong functional division be­
tween rulers and ruled. T h e ruler had to be an extraordinary moral and intellectual 
au thor i ty first, and there is n o d o u b t that Masaryk considered himself (and Beneš) 
to be equipped wi th the necessary qualities for the highest office. In the strife over 
the C o n s t i t u t i o n , parties were genuinely concerned wi th w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if t o o 
m u c h p o w e r was concentrated in the hands of a Pres ident of lesser qualities than 
Masaryk, while Masaryk seems to have been bl ind to the prob lém, trust ing the force 
This organic view of society that does not recognize the need for independent control 
mechanisms also prevailed among the intellectuals writing in Přítomnost, see Winkler, 
Martina: Die Krise der Intelligenz: Zur Debatte um die Rolle der tschechischen Intelligenz 
in der Zeitschrift Přítomnost 1924-1939. In: Bohemia 39 (1998) 297-322. 
In 1925 Masaryk complained: " U p to now politics everywhere, and in particular also par-
liamentarism, suffers from anthropomorphism; the great majority of politically active peo­
ple a not capable of rising above themselves, they are not capable of liberating themselves 
from the cage of uncritical egocentrism. And because Citizens today are members of some 
party, partisanship [stranictvi] gains ground in parliamentarism; the interest of the whole is 
identified with the exclusive interest of the parties and hence a few people, sometimes one 
person. The parliaments are not yet representatives of the nation, the people, the masses, 
but of parties and basically of cliques, of influential and strong - 1 don't say: leading! - indi-
viduals." Masaryk, T. G.: Světová revoluce za války a ve válce [The World Revolution 
During and In the War]. Praha 1925, 543. 
Works on Masaryk's perception of politics and democracy include Schmidt-Hartmann, 
Eva: T. G. Masaryk und die Volksdemokratie. In: Bohemia 23 (1982) 370-387. - Szporluk: 
Masaryk's Idea of Democracy (cf. fn. 64). - Idem: The Political Thought of Thomas 
G. Masaryk, New York 1981. - Batscha, Zwi: Eine Philosophie der Demokratie: Thomas 
G. Masaryks Begründung einer neuzeitlichen Demokratie. Frankfurt/M. 1994. 
The quotation, from a speech of 1908, is found in Szporluk: Masaryk's Idea of Democracy 
47 (cf. fn. 64). - Masaryk expressed much the same viewpoints in 1925, see Masaryk: 
Světová revoluce 532-593 (cf. fn. 67). 
22 Bohemia Band 47 (2006/07) 
of his ethics. E m a n u e l Rádi, one of the few p r o f o u n d critics of Masaryk's ideas in the 
First Republ ic from a liberal democrat ic p o i n t of view, noted this danger: 
The insufficiency of the humanitarian programme consists in that it in the last resort leaves the 
power in the hands of those who de facto have it, and just appeals to their conscience to use it 
humanely [...]. This humanitarianism then differs from enlightened absolutism only by its 
being morally more conscious; but it shares with it that it in principle does not abolish the 
distinction between rulers and ruled. 
If Masaryk's concept ion of ' ruler ' had monarchie features, so did the tradit ions 
and ceremonies created a r o u n d the President. Masaryk's age, his habits and his 
paternalistic approach to the well-being of his subjects made comparisons wi th 
F r a n z Joseph natural . T h e ways in w h i c h he intervened in politics, and his m a n y Sta­
tements suggest that he saw himself as an enlightened, patriarchal ruler, w h o had to 
supervise the doings of ministers, politicians and civil servants to secure that they did 
n o t h i n g w r o n g . 7 1 This self-stylization was echoed in a massive, eult-like adorat ion of 
Masaryk, w h i c h reached unusua l heights in inter-war Czechoslovakia. U n d o u b t e d -
ly it was necessary t o find an integrating symbol in a politically, religiously, nat io-
nally and socially divided State, b u t the massive identification of State, regime, and 
personal i ty made Masaryk alone stand o u t as the incarnat ion and guardian of 
Czechos lovak democracy. 7 2 
This e m b o d i m e n t of the State in one p e r s o n suggests a p r e - m o d e r n unders tanding 
of political rule, based o n charismatic author i ty ra ther than o n impersonal principles 
of the rule of law. H e u m o s has s h o w n that this was also h o w m a n y Czechos lovak 
w o r k e r s pereeived the Situation. Masaryk was virtually b o m b a r d e d wi th pet i t ions, 
appeals, and m e m o r a n d a , and visited b y a stream of w o r k e r s ' delegations asking h i m 
t o adjudicate legal and social conflicts. In the eyes of the workers , Masaryk appea-
red as a semi-legal authority, and justice was u n d e r s t o o d as a moral ly-founded inter-
action rather than a legal principle. Masaryk was the ' good king ' w h o w o u l d enact 
justice against the 'evil lords, ' and this personal, paternalistic approach t o social con­
flicts - favoured also b y Masaryk himself - was (as argued above) also encouraged 
b y the disaggregation of social conflicts preferred b y the parties. As a consequence, 
Rádi: Válka Čechů s Němci 268, see also 262 (cf. fn. 17). 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 84 (cf. fn. 12). - Čapek, Karel: Hovory s T. G. Masarykem 
[Conversations with T. G. Masaryk]. Praha 1936 (1990 edn.), 196. 
Vlnas writes interestingly about the 'kýč tatíčkovský' (approximately: Dear Old Daddy 
Kitsch) as the most potent form of kitsch in the First Republic, which supported a tradition 
that continued later with Gottwald and to some extent even Václav Havel, see Vlnas, Vit: 
Mýty a kýče první republiky [The Myths and Kitsch of the First Republic]. In: Přítomnost 
8 (1991) 28-29. - See also Soubigou: Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk 280-282 (cf. fn. 55). -Kárník: 
České země, vol. 1, 408, 415-416 (cf. fn. 2). - The idea that a democratic ruler like Masaryk 
or Beneš alone could guarantee or incarnate democracy reappears in the writings of 
Olivová, Broklová and others. So, Olivová writes about the post-1945 regime in Czecho­
slovakia (in which she finds that "the basic attributes of a democratic society - individual 
freedom and freedom of the press - were renewed"): "[W]ith the publishing of some of 
Masaryk's works the democratic principles of the First Republic were brought back to life," 
see Olivová: Manipulace s dějinami 447 (cf. fn. 2). 
Bugge: Czech Democracy 1918-1938 23 
though, the institutional arrangements of the State played only an insignificant role 
in the political value systém of the workers.73 
According to Heumos, the habit of sending workers' delegations to the ruler con-
tinued in the Protectorate when von Neurath was in office,74 and even in a Journal 
like Přítomnost, a pillar of support for Masaryk's conception of democracy and the 
First Czechoslovak Republic, the vision of the patriarchal 'good ruler' as the guar-
dian of justice continued after October 1938, or March 1939. In a portrait of Hácha 
of November 30, 1938, we read about this hitherto rather anonymous judge: "[...] 
he knows Czechoslovak life perfectly well [...]. He does not need instruction, he 
knows best of all where our Czech, Slovák, and Carpatho-Russian shoe pinches," 
and also: "[...] a lawyer of his type is capable of creating justice/right [právo] even 
against the law, without breaking the highest principle of justice [spravedlnost]."75 
Remarkably, Masaryk's national philosophy could even be presented as applicable 
to a Situation witnessing a radical break with parliamentary democracy and a collec-
tive withdrawal to a non-political sphere. 'What would Masaryk do today?, specu-
lated Peroutka in an editorial of March 7, 1939, Masaryk's birthday. First and fore-
most, Peroutka held, he would never surrender his humanitarian programme, and 
probably he would also return to his 'positive politics' from Austria, and especially 
to the "small, non-political work" [drobnou, nepolitickou práci], which was best for 
a nation that could not expect any great political victories.76 This was a return to the 
Masaryk of the 1890's, the Masaryk who turned his back to parliamentary and party 
politics and opposed the spirituál Czech idea of "humanity" to the liberal Western 
idea of "democratism." Indirectly, it also marked a farewell to another very impor-
tant dimension in Masaryk's ideology of Czechoslovak democracy: starting around 
the turn of the Century, Masaryk began to embrace the concept of democracy as 
equivalent to humanity, and built around it his grand theory of global historical 
Heumos, Peter: Die Arbeiterschaft in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. In: 
Bohemia 29 (1988) 50-72, here 69-71. 
From a personal conversation, August 1999. I am very grateful for this information and 
other advice from Peter Heumos. 
Palkovský, B.: Třetí president republiky [The Third President of the Republic]. In: Příto­
mnost 15, 48 (30.11.1938) 759-762, quotations on 762 and 759. - See also Peroutka's 
remarks on Hácha in the editorial in the samé issue: 'Po česku' [In a Czech Way]. Ibid. 753. 
- On von Neurath, see Studnička, Arnošt: Říšský protektor [The Reich Protector]. In: 
Přítomnost 16, 12 (22.3.1939) 177-178. - On the attitudes of Peroutka and Přítomnost 
during the Second Republic, see Rataj: Konečná diagnóza 151 (cf. fn. 7). - Rataj: O autori­
tativní národní stát 190-193 (cf. fn. 10). 
"It is impossible to imagine that he wouldn't také the conditions of power today into 
account: then he wouldn't deserve the title of realist, which was so valuable to him." 
Peroutka, Ferdinand: Co by dnes dělal Masaryk? [What Would Masaryk Do Today?]. In: 
Přítomnost 16, 10 (8.3.1939) 145-146, quotations on 146. - One month later, Zdeněk 
Smetáček reached the samé conclusion, see his article: Nepolitická politika - naše metoda 
nynější [Non-political politics - our present method]. In: Přítomnost 16, 15 (12.4.1939) 
217. The word democracy does not figuře in the two articles. 
Hoffmann, Roland J.: T G. Masaryk und die tschechische Frage. München 1988, 278 (VCC 
58). - Bugge, Peter: Czech Nation-Building, National Self-Perception, and Politics, 1780-
1914. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Aarhus 1994, 249, 291. 
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transi t ion from theocracy to democracy. In the conflict between these Systems, the 
essentially democrat ic nature of the Czechs secured t h e m a place on the right side of 
the barricade, and Masaryk came t o see in the course of the World War and the cre-
ation of Czechoslovakia a confirmation of his theories, w h i c h obtained semi-can-
onical status at h o m e after the war. 7 8 
This m y t h of democracy as the natural answer to the ' C z e c h quest ion ' u n d o u b -
tedly s t rengthened the C z e c h national c o m m i t m e n t to democracy in the First 
Republic, b u t it also had its problemat ic sides. First, the m y t h had little r o o m for the 
non-nat ional qualities of the democrat ic idea, and the ideological intertwining of 
democracy and Czechness could all t o o easily justify a util itarian approach t o d e m o ­
cratic principles: t o be against the Czechs was t o be against democracy and vice 
versaP Secondly, if the C z e c h c o m m i t m e n t to democracy rested on the assumpt ion 
that there was a h a r m o n y between w o r l d history, national interests, and democrat ic 
rule, a p r o f o u n d crisis in the national ethos had t o occur once this correlat ion was 
n o longer perceived as valid. This h a p p e n e d in O c t o b e r 1938, leading to the speedy 
rejection of 'Masaryk's democracy, ' a long w i t h his ' revolut ionary ' ideas that the 
nat ion was essentially Protes tant , and that Czechs and Slovaks were one nat ion. 8 0 
Masaryk's last gift to C z e c h democracy was Edvard Beneš, w h o came t o e m b o d y 
the ideological and political cont inui ty between the First Republ ic and the post-1945 
regime, for good and for bad. D u r i n g the war, Beneš managed to restore Masaryk's 
grand historical narrative of the move from theocracy t o democracy, adding to it his 
o w n convict ion that wi th in democracy there w o u l d be a move from formal, liberal 
democracy to real social and economic democracy. Beneš shared m o s t of Masaryk's 
assumptions a b o u t politics - including the distrust of political parties; the emphasis 
on the mora l and intellectual qualities of the democrat ic leader; and the low interest 
in, or respect for the formal and const i tut ional aspects of democracy. Yet he stressed 
The theory is summed up in Masaryk, T. G.: Nová Evropa [The New Europe]. Praha 1920. 
- Masaryk, T G.: Světová revoluce (cf. fn. 67). 
In her study of how Czech and German nationalists challenged liberal principles in their 
struggle over children Tara Zahra argues: "As Czech nationalists assumed statě power in 
1918, they knit democratic values, national self-determination, and ethnic character into a 
tightly wo ven tautology [...]. If the nation-state was seen as the highest expression of 
democratic will, at the local level, nationalists interpreted German resistance to their statě 
as a sign that German Citizens rejected democratic values altogether. This assertion enabled 
Czech nationalists to claim a monopoly on democratic values, and it justified statě suspi-
cion of all German-speaking Citizens, reducing them to de-facto second class Citizens." 
Zahra, Tara: Your Child Belongs to the Nation: Nationalization, Germanization, and 
Democracy in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1945. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan 
2005. 
See Rataj: O autoritativní národní stát 190-193 (cf. fn. 10). - It is striking how even a Pětka 
founder and Hrad sympathizer like Rudolf Bechyně was very quick to reject parliamentary 
democracy as historically outdated and unsuitable for the Czechs after October 1938: 
"Nothing worse could happen to us than if Czecho-Slovak politics today would be guided 
by the statě of affairs, which counted in Europe yesterday [...]. Today, an error could not 
be rectified through some means of a parliamentary systém, for example a change of 
government or elections. These are props from ancient times, let us say from 1938 - for that 
is ancient times." Bechyně, Rudolf: Dosti! [Enough!]. In: Přítomnost 16, 5 (1.2.1939) 65-66. 
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the idea of politics as science and of social equality, in the interest of w h i c h the pr in­
ciple of l iberty could be restricted as a secondary, derived value. 8 1 T h a t Benes's dista-
ste for tradit ional liberal par l iamentary democracy was n o t a post-1938 p h e n o m e n o n 
is reflected in this q u o t a t i o n from 1923: 
I think that I could prove philosophically and ethically, that in our conditions it is necessary to 
stand up consistently against any revolution from the right, and that there might emerge a Situ­
ation where one could defend a revolution from the left. 
Conclusion 
So was C z e c h democracy in the First Republ ic a paragon or a p a r o d y ? Perhaps the 
best answer is that it was very m u c h a paradox, that virtue and vice were intrinsical-
ly l inked. 
O n the one hand w e m u s t agree wi th Victor S. Mamatey, that "despi te its m a n y 
l imitations, the First Republ ic had b r o u g h t political f reedom and h u m a n dignity n o t 
only t o the C z e c h and Slovák peoples b u t also t o its G e r m a n , H u n g a r i a n , Polish, and 
R u t h e n i a n minori t ies ," and that it was the only " e n d u r i n g E u r o p e a n democracy east 
of the R h i n e " in the inter-war years. 8 3 Czechoslovakia was also an " o p e n society and 
a civic society," 8 4 and very i m p o r t a n t l y (drawing o n the legacy from Austria) it 
remained a State u n d e r the rule of law (Rechtsstaat), recognizing and protect ing the 
basic civil rights of its Citizens, even helping refugees from the ne ighbour ing dicta-
torships, including N a z i G e r m a n y . 
O n the other hand the price for stabilizing this society was an encroachment of 
some basic democrat ic principles. If the Czechos lovak C o n s t i t u t i o n of 1920 - as the 
only Constitution in the region - survived unchanged unti l 1938, it was also because 
the President and the government neglected or violated m a n y of its provis ions. O n e 
of its authors , Frant išek Weyr, protes ted in the early 1930's against this State of 
affairs, d e m a n d i n g either a const i tut ional re form or a r e t u r n t o strict const i tut ional 
legality.8 5 But politically b o t h opt ions were impracticable (also, given the political 
Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 101 (cf. fn. 12). — In his book of 1939, 'Democracy Today and 
Tomorrow,' Beneš spends two sections in the chapter 'The Future of Democracy' on 'What 
Politics Should be in the Democratic Regime' (a real science and the highest art), and 'What 
a Statesman and Leader Should Be in the Democratic Regime' (a man of great erudition and 
analytical skills, capable of quick decision making), but not a word on populär participation 
(except for the remark that the leader must be elected), or on how to construct constitutio­
nal or legal arrangements protecting democracy from abuse. See Beneš, Eduard: Democracy 
Today and Tomorrow. London 1939, 201-213. 
Quoted from Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 171 (cf. fn. 12). Klimek ends his second part of 
"Boj o hrad" with the Observation that not a single party, which opposed the election of 
Beneš as President in December 1935, even if it supported him in the end, was permitted in 
Czechoslovakia after the Second World War, see Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 2, 476 (cf. fn. 48). 
Mamatey: The Development of Czechoslovak Democracy 166 (cf. fn. 18). 
Musil, Jiří: Česká společnost 1918-1938 [Czech Society 1918-1938]. In: Pravdová, Božena 
(ed.): Dějiny obyvatelstva českých zemí [A History of the Inhabitants of the Bohemian 
Lands]. Praha 1998, 267-310, here 307. 
Lipscher: Verfassung und politische Verwaltung 169-170 (cf. fn. 11). 
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atmosphere in 1933 a reform would hardly have improved the quality of Czechoslo­
vak democracy), and the principle of respect for the letter of the law was peripheral 
to the political culture of the ruüng elites. 
From the outset these elites also saw to it that Czechoslovak democracy did 
not come to mean populär rule in any Üteral sense. The Parliament was deprived of 
any power or independence as a channel for populär influence and control. The 
President and the party leaders shared a distrust for 'the masses,' and Masaryk's poli­
tical philosophy in particular reserved genuine policy making for a select elite, while 
making democracy a social and an ethical norm, rather than a political exercise. 
Masaryk clearly saw his function sub specie aeternitatis rather than sub specie popu-
li. At several occasions the President and the party elites even demonstrated their 
readiness to use undemocratic means (an oktroj, bribery, manipulations with voting 
rights, bans on parties, etc.) to secure a desirable result, such as when they conside­
red turning elections into an instrument expressing Czech national elite interests 
rather than respecting them as a means for Czechoslovak Citizens to express their 
free political will. 
Similar concerns seriously weakened populär involvement in local self-govern-
ment. At the lowest administrative level, the municipality (obec), new legislation of 
1919 brought a genuine democratization, but eternal budgetary problems reduced 
the municipalities' liberty of action and allowed the State to intervene in their eco-
nomies. Also, a law of 1933 established that all locally elected mayors needed the 
approval of the Ministry of the Interior or the Province administration before they 
could take office. Non-approval led to three years' quarantine from local politics for 
the affected mayor. At higher levels - district (okres), county (župa), or province 
(země) - the degree of centralized State control was increased compared to pre-1918 
Austria. The powers and the resources of these regional organs of self-government 
were limited, the franchise was more restricted than at municipality or parliamenta­
ry level, and even one third of their members were appointed by the Government 
and the Ministry of the Interior. National considerations dictated these measures in 
large part - an unwillingness to grant the German, and to a lesser extent the Slovák 
minorities too much autonomy - but this deliberate weakening of these Systems of 
democratic political participation again seems to reflect an philosophy of diverting 
populär energies and commitment away from the state's political and administrative 
spheres.86 
A law of 1920 introduced a systém of seif-governing counties to replace the two-tiered 
Habsburg administrative systém, but it was never implemented in the Bohemian Lands as 
it proved technically impossible to avoid creating counties with German majorities. 
Broklová has a fascinating formulation of the problém: "Strictly legally speaking the coun­
ty systém was good, but it gave too much to Citizens who were not loyal towards the State, 
and too little to Citizens who were faithful towards it." See Broklová: Československá 
demokracie 54 (cf. fn. 18). - Therefore, in 1927 the county systém was abandoned and the 
historie lands/provinces recreated, albeit with much reduced competences (except at muni­
cipality level, local self-government was actually reduced after 1918). Also, Silesia was mer-
ged with Moravia, since non-Czechs constituted a majority in Silesia. See Kárník: České 
země, vol. 1, 103-104, 404-407 (cf. fn. 2). -Broklová: Československá demokracie 50-55 (cf. 
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T h e disregard for the formal aspects of democracy and const i tut ional ism and the 
willingness to dispense wi th it for the sake of political efficiency is a heritage that 
lived on in C z e c h political culture after 1945, or even 1989. 8 7 T h e t radi t ion of infor­
mal decis ion-making in closed forums of ' responsible ' C z e c h parties also lingered. 
Emil Franzel (a Sudeten G e r m a n Social D e m o c r a t ) has compared the coalit ion 
behind the Pětka w i th the National Front of 1945, 8 8 and similarly in 1948, P r o k o p 
D r t i n a was unable t o see in the N a t i o n a l F r o n t anything b u t a "popular-democrat ic 
Pětka."89 In this light one m a y suggest that the ban on the Agrarians greatly facili-
tated the inclusion of the C o m m u n i s t s in this g roup of responsible Czechos lovak 
parties: in 1945, the C o m m u n i s t s s imply received some of the vacant ' t radi t ional ' 
Agrarian possessions, like the Minis t ry of Agriculture and the Minis t ry of the 
Interior. 
T h e parties represent another paradox. T h e relevant l i teratuře almost universally 
holds that the parties were extremely powerful in the First Republic, b u t the rapid 
collapse of the p a r t y systém in 1938, and the lack of any serious a t tempts to restore 
for instance the Agrarian P a r t y in 1945 9 0 suggest the opposi te . Also, the C z e c h o ­
slovak political representat ion in exile in L o n d o n was built a r o u n d people h a n d -
picked b y Beneš m o r e than b y people selected b y the parties. This article has n o 
scope for a systematic s t u d y of internal p a r t y life, b u t it seems likely that m u c h 
energy was consumed in the battle for u p h o l d i n g p a r t y territories in the pillarized 
socio-political s t ructure, and that the p a r t y elites ruled rather independent ly of their 
membersh ip basis. True pol icy-making thus h a p p e n e d in a quite narrow, informally 
organized elite b o u n d m o r e b y personal contacts, loyalties, and trust than b y p a r t y 
p r o g r a m m e s (cf. the Pětka or the Hrad groups in all parties). T h e inability of these 
elites t o secure their generational renewal suggests Stagnation in the parties (and 
in the H r a d ) , and from the 1930's widespread was the percept ion that the existing 
political systém was in crisis.9 1 
fn. 18). -Janák, ]nn/Hledíková, Zdeňka: Dějiny správy v českých zemích do roku 1945 
[The History of Administration in the Bohemian Lands until 1945]. Praha 1989, 443-449. 
Bugge, Peter: Democracy and Parliament in Czech Politics. In: Sarensen, Lene B0gh/ 
Eliason, Leslie E. (eds.): Forward to the Past: Continuity and Change in Political De­
velopment in Hungary, Austria and the Czech and Slovák Republics. Aarhus 1997,161-177. 
- Another legacy visible even after 1989 is the ideological and political conflict between 
party and anti-party principles ("stranictví" and "antistranictví"), between a rather static 
and self-contained particularism and a basically anti-pluralistic avant-garde call for political 
engineering in the name of a higher, universally binding, often morally defined principle. 
Often, the leading parties and the President have incarnated these two poles, but the ten-
sion has more dimensions than that. 
Bachstein, Martin K.: Die soziologische Struktur der „Burg" - Versuch einer Struktur­
analyse. In: Bosl (ed.): Die „Burg", vol. 1, 47-68, here 50 (cf. fn. 54). — Klimek cites this 
Observation, but calls Franzel Franke, confusing the former with the leading Czech 
National Socialist politician, see Klimek: Boj o hrad, vol. 1, 177 (cf. fn. 12). 
Heumos: Der Klabautermann und der lydische Hirte 410 (cf. fn. 8). 
Dostál, Vladimír V: Agrární strana - její rozmach a zánik [The Agrarian Party - Its 
Expansion and End]. Brno 1998, 234. 
For a fine summary of these problems, see Hölzer: Stranický systém druhé republiky 1037-
1039, 1054-1055 (cf. fn. 10). 
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This is the last paradox of the First Republic: in the light of later events it has been 
the object of much nostalgia, far more profound than any utilitarian attempt at myth 
making after 1989.92 But towards the end of the First Republic's lifetime almost eve-
rybody - even in the Czech political and intellectual elites - wanted radical reforms 
that the given democratic systém was unable to deliver. As for the bulk of the Czech 
population, we have argued that the political culture with its strong patriarchal 
accents, and the fabric of the intermediary political systém nourished a populär in-
difference towards the higher institutional arrangements of the statě. National inte­
gration was high, but political integration low, and so within less than ten years, mil-
lions of Czechs enrolled in the spring and fall of 1938 in the defence of the Republic, 
in the spring of 1939 in the authoritarian, un-political 'National Assemblage' 
(Národní souručenství), and in the spring of 1945 in the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia.93 
See Bugge, Peter: Longing or Belonging? Czech Perceptions of Europe in the Inter-War 
Years and Today. In: Yearbook of European Studies 11 (1999), 111-129, on the post-1989 
myth of an unproblematic Czech belonging and adherence to (Western) Europe in the 
inter-war years. 
The mass attendance at Masaryk's funeral on September 21, 1937 can be added to the list. 
See Bolton, Jonathan: Mourning Becomes the Nation: The Funeral of Tomáš G. Masaryk in 
1937. In: Bohemia 45 (2004) 115-131; especially 128-131 on the contentious contemporary 
interpretation of the crowds. 
